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Editorial
Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec'
Regulatory and Judicial Implementations of Patent
Law Flexibilities
Director-General of the WTO Pascal Lamy recently suggested that a funda-
mental change taking place in international trade is "the rise of key emerging
economies and the shift in economic realities that this implies." Indeed,
during the long course of the Doha round negotiations, these emerging
economies have been grouped at times with developed countries and at times
with other developing countries, indicating their unique needs and interests
as countries in transition. The standpoint of emerging countries can be seen
in portions of the WTO agreement, with flexibilities negotiated that allow
for the medical needs of their populations and simultaneously further eco-
nomic development. With India in the spotlight for its recent grant of a
compulsory license and for its patent eligibility rules, it is a good time to
reflect on the flexibilities negotiated into the TRIPS Agreement and their
implementation through domestic legal regimes. Although world focus is on
developing countries, these flexibilities are also present to some degree in the
United States, albeit judicially determined and applied. To the extent some
flexibility in implementation is inevitable, these instances raise universally
applicable questions about the proper role of administrative agencies and
courts in implementing policies that are influenced by both trade and patent
policies.
During the negotiations leading to TRIPS, developed countries favored a
uniform, baseline level of patent protection for all member countries. De-
veloping countries sought to retain .flexibility in various provisions particu-
larly those implicating access to lifesaving drugs. Two cases coming out of
India illustrate applications of these flexibilities and their implementation
through the Indian administrative regime. The recent issuance of a cornpul-
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sory license by the Indian Patent Office is the result of the flexibility reserved
to member countries to permit certain, otherwise unauthorized uses of
patented articles or processes. In addition, a case now before the Indian
Supreme Court will determine the legality of a regime that denies protection
to newer forms of known chemical compounds that do not exhibit signifi-
cantly improved efficacy.
The Indian compulsory license order covers Bayer's "Nexavar", a cancer-
fighting drug, and is the country's first compulsory license in the seventeen
years since TRIPS took effect. The patent office granted the license after
determining that the reasonable requirements of the public were not met,
that the patented drug was not available to the public at a reasonable price,
and that the patented invention was not worked in India. This last element
of the rule - a requirement of local working - derives from early patent laws
in now-developed countries, but its roots are firmly planted in trade consid-
erations. Although TRIPS requires developed countries to encourage tech-
nology transfer to developing countries thus spurring local industry, the
"working requirement" has been criticized as a possible violation of the non-
discrimination provision of Art. 27 of TRIPS.
The battle over India's patentability rules centers on "Gleevec". Also a
cancer-fighting drug, Gleevec targets leukemia. Novartis, the Swiss company
that manufactures Gleevec, has challenged the Indian Patent Office's denial
of its application. The Indian Patent Law prohibits the grant of patents to
new forms of known substances. The law seeks to limit a practice called
"evergreening," whereby pharmaceutical companies may effectively extend
the lives of their patents by applying for patents on slightly different chemi-
cal entities with only marginal improvements to effectiveness. In parallel to
this concern about patent overreach, however, the law also clearly vindicates
the interests of the robust domestic generic drug industry in India.
Both of these cases highlight the implementation of f1exibilities in TRIPS
negotiated by developing countries and legislated and implemented through
regulatory agencies. They stand in contrast to the practice of developed
countries. In the United States, for example, there is no compulsory licensing
provision, nor is there a requirement that a patent be worked domestically
for a patent holder to exercise her right to exclude. However, there may be
court-implemented deviations from the strong, exclusive right that was
negotiated for under TRIPS. Thus, in recent years, courts have been denying
permanent injunctions to patent holders that are not competitors and fail to
show a loss of market share due to the infringing activities. This trend stems
from a Supreme Court decision, eBay v. MercExchange, which on its face
affirmed the application of traditional rules of equity to the grant of perma-
nent injunctions in patent law. However, the Court also addressed, through
concurring opinions, growing concern over entities that do not practice their
patents but seek arguably excessive compensation from those who would.
The same analytical framework may also lead courts to deny injunctions in
situations that implicate urgent, public health concerns, although this provi-
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sion has been invoked only rarely. Nonetheless, the equitable concerns
encompassed in the test for injunctive relief as applied by courts in the
United States can be mapped to the roles of both public health and local
industry evident in the analysis of the Indian Patent Office.
To the extent uniformity among patent laws is important, we might question
flexibilities - such as those embodied in the Indian law - that allow for denials
of patents or subsequent grams of compulsory licenses. However, if flexibility
is inevitable - perhaps even desirable - important institutional questions arise
as to its implementation. Institutional competence reasons to value agency
implementation may not apply to issues that sound so strongly in trade
concerns. Thus, public health concerns and the changing needs of domestic
industry may best be decided by a patent office in the first instance, but this is
not a foregone conclusion. However, judicially imposed flexibiliries also raise
concerns. Although case law may be slowly tailored and course-corrected
over time, this type of implementation does not lend itself to harmonization
with other regimes. As uniformity and harmonization become the norm, the
deviations implemented by TRIPS signatories will continue to receive scru-
tiny. The methods of this implementation are one aspect of these flexibilities
that is bound to prove central to a fair comparison and analysis of this
important and dynamic area of international law.
